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Despite in many cases dramatic reductions in the male-female pay gap since 
the  1950s, gender differentials persist in all industrialized nations. However, 
the size of the gender gap varies considerably across countries. Published data 
suggest that, by the late 1980s, the Scandinavian countries, France, Australia, 
and New Zealand had female/male hourly pay ratios of  80-90  percent while 
other countries  in Western  Europe  and  the United  States had  pay ratios  of 
roughly 65-75  percent. The United States was among the countries with the 
largest differentials. Only Japan, with a ratio as low as 50 percent, had a consis- 
tently larger gap (see fig. 3.1). This paper uses micro data to analyze interna- 
tional differences in the gender pay gap among a sample of ten industrialized 
nations. We particularly focus on explaining the surprisingly low ranking of 
the United States in comparison to other industrialized countries. An advantage 
of  an international perspective is that countries vary with respect to govern- 
ment policies, women’s  relative labor market qualifications, and wage-setting 
institutions. Such variability allows one to infer reasons for differences in the 
pay gap and, by implication, the effect of alternative government policies. 
Empirical research on gender pay gaps has traditionally focused on the role 
of  gender differences in qualifications and of  differences in the treatment of 
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Fig. 3.1  Femaldmale hourly earnings ratios, nonagricultural workers, 1967-90 
Sources: Various issues of OECD, Labour Force Statistics; ILO, Yearbook of Labour Statistics; 
and US.  BLS, Handbook of Labor Statistics. 
otherwise equally qualified male and female workers  (i.e., labor market dis- 
crimination). Analyses of  trends  over time in the gender  differential  within 
countries as well as intercountry comparisons of gender earnings ratios have 
tended to emphasize these types of gender-specific factors. An innovative fea- 
ture of our study is to focus on the role of wage structure as an additional factor 
influencing the gender gap. To analyze the effect of wage structure, we adapt a 
framework developed by Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce (1991) to analyze trends 
over time in race differentials in the United States. Our findings suggest that 
labor market institutions that affect overall wage inequality have an extremely 
important effect on the gender earnings gap. 
Wage structure  describes the array of  prices  set for various  labor market 
skills (measured and unmeasured) and rents received for employment in partic- 
ular sectors of  the economy. Research on gender-specific factors influencing 
the pay gap suggests that men and women tend to have different levels of labor 
market skills and to be employed in different sectors. This implies a potentially 
important role for wage structure in determining the pay gap. For example, 
suppose that, in two countries, women have lower levels of labor market expe- 
rience than men but that the gender difference in experience is the same. If the 
return to experience is higher in one country, then that nation will have a larger 
gender pay gap. Or, as another example, suppose that the extent of occupa- 
tional segregation by  sex is the same in two countries but that the wage pre- 
mium associated with employment in male jobs is higher in one country. Then, 
again, that country will have a higher pay gap. 
Skill prices can be affected by relative supplies, by technology (e.g., high- 107  The Gender Earnings Gap: Some International Evidence 
tech industries place a premium on highly trained workers), by the composition 
of demand, or, as emphasized in this paper, by the wage-setting institutions of 
each country. Specifically, centralized wage-setting institutions, which tend to 
reduce interfirm and interindustry wage variation and are often associated with 
conscious policies to raise the relative pay of low-wage workers (regardless of 
gender), may indirectly reduce the gender pay gap. 
The striking finding of  this  study is the enormous  importance  of  overall 
wage  structure  in  explaining  the  international  differences,  particularly  the 
lower ranking  of  U.S.  women. The higher  level  of  wage  inequality  in  the 
United States than elsewhere works to increase the gender differential in the 
United States relative to all the other countries in our sample. Our results sug- 
gest that the U.S. gap would be similar to that in countries like Sweden, Italy, 
and Australia (the countries with the smallest gaps) if  the United States had 
their level of wage inequality. 
This insight helps resolve three puzzling sets of facts: (1) U.S. women com- 
pare favorably with women in other countries in terms of human capital and 
occupational status; (2) the United States has had a longer and often stronger 
commitment  to equal pay  and  equal employment  opportunity policies  than 
have most of the other countries in our sample; but (3) the gender pay gap is 
larger in the United States than in most industrialized countries. An important 
part of  the explanation of  this pattern  is that the labor market in the United 
States places a much larger penalty on those with lower levels of labor market 
skills (both measured and unmeasured). Put differently, our findings suggest 
that the gender gap in pay in the United States would be far less than it is if U.S. 
wage-setting processes more closely resembled those in the other countries, as 
long as U.S. women retained the same level of relative skills.' 
In addition to having a relatively high level of wage inequality, the U.S. labor 
market has seen a major increase in inequality and the rewards to skills over 
the  1970s and  1980s (Katz  and  Murphy  1992; Juhn, Murphy,  and  Pierce, 
1993). Thus, while American women  have increased their relative  levels of 
labor market skills (Blau and Ferber 1992; O'Neill and Polachek 1993), they 
are essentially swimming upstream in a labor market that has grown increas- 
ingly unfavorable to those with below-average  skills. The decline in the U.S. 
gender pay gap in the 1980s becomes all the more impressive in light of this 
growing overall inequality. Below, we present U.S. data indicating that, over 
the period  1971-88,  rising U.S. wage inequality reduced the potential conver- 
gence in the gender pay gap by about one-fourth. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 3.1 presents a brief overview of 
our findings,  highlighting  the  striking  importance  of  wage  structure  in ex- 
plaining the international differences. Section 3.2 summarizes the institutional 
setting in each country, focusing on gender-specific policies and the degree of 
1, Of course, under different wage-setting institutions, U.S. women might have different incen- 
tives to acquire labor market skills. 108  Francine D. Blau and Lawrence M. Kahn 
centralization of wage-setting institutions. Section 3.3 outlines the basic ana- 
lytic framework and presents detailed empirical results based on our micro- 
data files. Section 3.4  examines the effect of rising inequality on the U.S. gen- 
der pay gap over the period 1971-88.  Finally, section 3.5  presents our conclu- 
sions. 
3.1  An Overview of the Findings 
International differences in gender gaps are summarized in figure 3.2, which 
gives gender earnings ratios adjusted for hours for ten industrialized countries 
on the basis of our micro-data  files for each country. Data are from the mid- 
1980s, with the exception of Norway and Sweden, for which the data are from 
around  1980.* (More detailed information about the data and the adjustment 
process is given below.) Figure 3.2 indicates that Italy, Sweden, Austria, and 
Australia have the highest gender ratios. The United States ranks toward the 
bottom of the group, with six of the nine countries (Sweden, Norway, Australia, 
Austria, Italy, and Germany) having higher gender earnings ratios and only 
three (the United Kingdom, Hungary, and Switzerland) having lower ratios. 
The Italian ratio probably overstates the actual gender ratio in that country. 
Italy has an especially large proportion of workers who are self-employed or 
work in an informal sector in which government-mandated benefits  are not 
paid. The self-employed could not be included in computing the gender ratio 
for Italy because hours worked were not available for them. However, we did 
ascertain that the gender ratio (not adjusted for hours) in Italy is considerably 
smaller (.6566)  when the self-employed are included than when the sample 
is restricted to employees (.7431).3  Further,  it is likely that informal  sector 
employment is underreported by the respondents in our survey-based data, pos- 
sibly also resulting in an understatement of the gender gap. Nonetheless, it is 
likely that Italy is among the countries with the smallest gender gaps, although 
not necessarily heading the list, as would be suggested by the data in figure 3.2. 
To  illuminate the role of wage structure, we present the mean percentile 
rankings of women in the male wage distribution for each country in figure 
3.3.4 Gender-specific factors, including differences  in qualifications  and the 
effect of labor market discrimination, are viewed as determining the percentile 
ranking of women in the male wage distribution, while the overall wage struc- 
2. The country rankings here are similar to those based on published data (when available) or 
other studies. Note, however, that the ratios for the Scandinavian countries and Australia are below 
those reported in OECD publications. This discrepancy appears to be due to the OECD data being 
restricted to manufacturing workers for Sweden and Norway and to nonsupervisory employees for 
Australia. The magnitudes of the gender ratios that we obtain are consistent with other studies that 
use micro data for these countries. 
3. The gender ratios for the other countries were similar regardless of whether the self-employed 
were included. Our results include the self-employed for the other countries. 
4. That is, we assign each woman in country j  a percentile ranking in country j’s  male wage 




















Fig. 3.3  Mean female percentile in male distribution 110  Francine D. Blau and Lawrence M. Kahn 
ture (as measured by the magnitude of male wage inequality) determines the 
wage penalty or reward associated with this position in the wage distribution. 
The basic premise is that males at the same percentile ranking as women may 
be viewed as comparable in the eyes of employers. Thus, the same set of factors 
will determine the relative rewards of women and of these comparable males, 
and differences between the rankings of countries in figures 3.2 and 3.3 repre- 
sent the role of wage structure. 
The most striking difference is for the United States. Whereas the United 
States ranks toward the bottom of the list with respect to the female/male earn- 
ings ratios, it ranks near the top in terms of women’s percentile ranking. Only 
Italy ranks higher, and, as noted above, we have most likely overstated Italy’s 
gender ratio. Thus, the relatively high gender pay gap in the United States does 
not appear to be due to a low ranking of women in the male wage distribution; 
rather, it is due to the higher level of  wage inequality in the United States, 
which results in an especially large wage penalty for being below average in 
the distribution. 
Also notable in comparing the two figures is the change in the rankings of 
the Scandinavian countries. Sweden falls from the second highest country in 
figure  3.2 to the  fifth in figure 3.3, while Norway  falls from fifth in figure 
3.2 to eighth in figure 3.3. This suggests that the relatively more equal wage 
distribution in the Scandinavian countries is an important reason for the rela- 
tively high status of women there. So, for example, while the mean percentile 
ranking of women in the United States is 33.2, at the U.S. level of male wage 
inequality this corresponds to a wage that is 66.9 percent of the male mean. In 
contrast, Swedish women’s percentile ranking of  28.2 corresponds to a wage 
that is 77.2 percent of the male mean, and Norwegian women’s ranking of 26.4 
corresponds to 7  I .4 percent of the male mean. 
3.2  The Institutional Setting 
In this section, we review international differences in gender-specific poli- 
cies and basic wage-setting institutions. Human capital is also a major determi- 
nant of gender pay gaps, and, below, we present some international compari- 
sons  of  women’s  relative  levels  of  measured  human  capital.  However, 
international differences in policies and institutions appear to be more dramatic 
than those in women’s relative human capital levels, at least in our sample. 
Further, human capital can be affected by such policies and institutions as dis- 
cussed below. We therefore emphasize the institutional setting in our compari- 
sons of  gender-based wage differentials. We first consider what the effect of 
the policies and wage-setting institutions is expected to be; then we compare 
each country to the United States across each dimension. We also note findings 
from previous research that  suggest the importance  of  both  gender-specific 
policies and labor market institutions in reducing the gender pay gap in spe- 
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Gender-specific policies include equal employment opportunity (EEO) and 
antidiscrimination laws as well as laws and policies governing family leave. 
The expected positive effect of  the former on the earnings ratio is reasonably 
straightforward, although the effect will most likely depend on the effective- 
ness of the legislation as well as its provisions. Moreover, evaluating the effect 
of EEO law changes on women’s relative pay  in specific instances is compli- 
cated by the difficulty of locating an appropriate control group and, as Ehren- 
berg (1989) has pointed out, the possibility that the change in law was endoge- 
nously determined. 
In general, it is expected that, given considerable segregation of women by 
occupation and industry, equal pay laws mandating equal pay for equal work 
within the same occupation and firm will have a relatively small effect. Laws 
requiring equal opportunity, hiring preferences, and/or “comparable worth” 
(i.e., equal pay for work of equal value to the firm, regardless of specific occu- 
pational category) have potentially larger effects on the wage differential. In 
addition, since EEO laws involve occupational shifts, they may require consid- 
erable time to have an effect on pay. Thus, the comparable worth approach that 
provides for immediate increases in relative pay in female-dominated occupa- 
tions may be expected to have the largest initial wage effect, possibly accompa- 
nied by a negative effect on female employment. 
The expected effect of  family leave (disproportionately taken by  women 
even when it is available to men) is unclear a priori. On the one hand, it is 
possible that such policies raise the relative earnings of women by encouraging 
the preservation of their ties to particular firms and hence increasing the incen- 
tives of employers and women to invest in firm-specific training. On the other 
hand, the existence of such policies could increase the incidence and/or dura- 
tion of  temporary labor force withdrawals among women, raising the gender 
gap for the affected group. Further, the incremental costs associated with man- 
dated leave policies may increase the incentives of employers to discriminate 
against women. 
With respect to wage structure, it seems likely that systems of centrally de- 
termined pay entail smaller gender wage differentials for a variety of reasons. 
First, in the United States, a significant portion of the male-female pay gap is 
associated with interindustry or interfirm wage differentials that result from its 
relatively decentralized pay-setting institutions (Blau 1977; Johnson and Solon 
1986; Sorensen 1990; and Groshen 1991). Thus, centralized systems that re- 
duce the extent of wage variation across industries and firms are likely to lower 
the gender differential, all else equal. Second, since in all countries the female 
wage distribution lies below the male distribution, centralized systems that 
consciously raise minimum pay  levels regardless of gender will also tend to 
lower male-female wage differentials.  Finally, the effect of gender-specific pol- 
icies to raise female wages may be greater under centralized systems where 
such policies can be more speedily and effectively implemented. 
We now turn to a comparison of the United States with the other countries in 112  Francine D. Blau and Lawrence M. Kahn 
our sample along each of these three dimensions. First, with respect to gender- 
specific discrimination policies, equal employment policy in the United StatesJ 
has consisted of  the Equal Pay  Act of  1963 (requiring equal pay  for equal 
work), the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (requiring equal employment opportunity), 
and the executive order implemented in 1968 (which requires government con- 
tractors to take “affirmative action” to see that women and minorities are equi- 
tably treated). Comparable worth pay policies remain rare in the private sector, 
although they have been adopted by a number of state governments. 
In general, U.S. policies in this area compare relatively favorably on their 
face to those of the other countries in our sample. All have passed some equal 
pay and equal opportunity legislation, but, interestingly, the U.S. commitment, 
particularly to equal employment opportunity, predates that in  most of  the 
other countries (see table 3.1). While Italy did mandate equal pay through col- 
lective bargaining in the industrial sector in  1960 (predating the U.S. Equal 
Pay Act by  three years), an equal employment opportunity act was not passed 
there until 1977. The earliest of  the other countries, Australia and the United 
Kingdom, began to implement equal pay in 1969 and 1970. Equal opportunity 
measures were instituted in 1975 in the United Kingdom and 1978 in Norway. 
The remainder of  the countries passed all relevant legislation in the  1980s. 
The one country with a clearly stronger intervention than the United States is 
Australia, the only one to have implemented a national policy of comparable 
worth through its labor courts (see below). (Although Switzerland incorpo- 
rated the principle of equal pay for work of  equal value into its constitution 
in  1981 [Simona 19851, there is no indication that it has been implemented 
as yet.) 
There is some econometric evidence that, all else equal, government policy 
in the 1970s raised the U.S. femalelmale pay ratio (Beller 1979) and, further, 
that the portion of the differential attributable to discrimination (as convention- 
ally measured) declined (Blau and Beller 1988). Stronger evidence of the effect 
of antidiscrimination policies has been obtained for Australia, Sweden, and the 
United Kingdom. Since the effect of these policies was related to labor market 
structure, we discuss it below. 
The laws governing maternity and parental leave as of  1988 in the various 
countries are summarized in table 3.2. The United States is the only country 
in our sample that did not have government-mandated  leave at the federal level. 
(The United States passed legislation mandating up to twelve weeks of unpaid 
leave in 1993.) However, it was (and continues to be) required in the United 
States that pregnancy be treated the same as any other medical disability. Thus, 
leave for the physical aspects of childbearing must be covered under a firm’s 
medical disability plan, if it has one. Further, in the late 1980s, 40 percent of 
employees of large and medium-size establishments were employed at firms 
that provided parental leave to women beyond this, the vast majority (92 per- 
5. For a summary, see Blau and Ferber (1992). Table 3.1  Equal Pay and Equal Employment Opportunity Policy 
Principal Implementing Measures 
Country  Policy  Year  Title  Enforcement Machinery 
Australia  Equal pay  I969  Major decisions by Conciliation and 
1972  Arbitration Commission 
Equal employment opportunity  1984  Sex Discrimination Act 
1984, 1987 
1986  Affirmative Action Act 
Public Service Act Amendments 
Austria  Equal Pay 
Equal employment opportunity 
Germany  Equal pay 
Italy 
Equal employment opportunity 
Equal employment opportunity 
(continued) 
1979 
1985  (Amended) 
1980 
Law on Equal Treatment in Employment 
Code of Civil Procedure (8612) 
1949  Basic Law 
1980  Code of Civil Procedure 
(§§611a, 611b, 612a) 
1986  Directive on professional promotion of 
women in federal administration 
1960  Equal Pay Agreement of the industrial 
sector 
1964  Equal Pay Law for the agricultural 
sector 
1977  Act on Equal Employment Opportunities 
between the Sexes 
1983  Ministerial Decree of the 
Implementation of Equal Employment 
Opportunities Principles 
Conciliation and Arbitration Commission 
Sex Discrimination Commissioner 
Public Service Commission 
Human Rights and Equal Opportunities 
Commission; Affirmative Action 
Agency 
Equality Commission 
Ministry of Labour 
Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs; 
Labour Courts 
Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs; 
Labour Courts 
1 
Ministry of Youth, Family, Women and 
Collective bargaining parties 
Health 
Ministry of  Labor 
1 
Labour tribunals; Ministry of Labour  1 Table 3.1  (continued) 
Country  Policy 
Principal Implementing Measures 
Year  Title  Enforcement Machinery 
Equal Pay  ]  1978 
Equal employment opportunity 
Norway 
Sweden  Equal Pay  1980 
Equal employment opportunity  ]  1983-84 
United Kingdom  Equal pay  1970 
1975 
1984 
Equal employment opportunity  1975 
1986 
United States  Equal pay  1963 
Equal employment opportunity  1964 
1972 
1968 
Act on Equal Status between the Sexes 
Basic Agreement between Employers’ 
and Trade Unions’ Confederation 
Act on Equality between Men and 
Women at Work 
Major Equal Opportunity Agreements 
between Employers’ and Trade 
Unions’ Confederation  in private and 
Public Sector 
Equal Pay Act 
(In force) 
(Amended) 
Sex Discrimination  Act 
(Amended) 
Equal Pay Act 
Civil Rights Act, Title VII 
Equal Employment Opportunities  Act 
Executive Order 11  375 
Equal Status Council; Equal Status 
Ombudsman;  Equal Status  Appeals 
Board 
Collective bargaining parties 
Equal Opportunity Ombudsman 
Collective  bargaining parties 
Industrial tribunals 
Equal Opportunities Commission (EOC); 
Equal Employment Oppoxtunity 
Equal Employment Opportunity 
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Table 3.2  Maternity and Parental Leave as of 1988 
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Paid as sicknessb 
Up to 90%" 
Mostly unpaid 
Unpaid (allowance possible) 
Paid (fixed allowance) 
Paid (child-care benefits) 
Paid (reduced benefits) 
Paid (social security) 
Paid' (social security) 
... 
Source: International Labour Organization, Conditions of  Work Digesf, vol. 7, no. 2 (February 
1988). tables 2 and 3, pp. 20-21. 
aProvisions for Commonwealth government employees include twelve weeks'  paid leave under 
certain conditions. 
bCompensation depends on the level of insurance. 
'Eighteen weeks paid at different rates. 
dSome states provide unpaid maternity leave. Federal law prohibits employment discrimination 
based on pregnancy and childbirth. 
'Applies  to some public-sector employees only. Parental leave may encompass maternity leave, 
adoption leave, etc. 
Ninety percent for the first 270 days, then reduced fixed rate. 
gIn  some states only. Up to twelve weeks, unpaid. 
cent) at firms offering unpaid leave (Hyland 1990). Plans allowed an average 
of twenty weeks off for unpaid leave. It may be noted that provision for parental 
leave is particularly generous in Sweden, where nearly a year of paid parental 
leave is provided after twelve weeks of paid (at 90 percent) maternity leave. 
While the United States clearly lags behind the other countries in the provision 
of parental leave, as our discussion above suggests, it is unclear what effect this 
will have on the pay gap. 
Pay setting is considerably less centralized in the United States than in the 
other countries in this study. The U.S. unionization rates of 20.5 percent for 
male and  12.5 percent for female workers are considerably lower than else- 
where  (see  table  3A.2). Further, the  collective bargaining  process  itself  is 
very  decentralized  in  the  United  States,  with  an  emphasis  on  single-firm 116  Francine D. Blau and Lawrence M. Kahn 
agreements, and the U.S. government intervenes only minimally  in wage set- 
ting (Flanagan et al. 1989). Wage determination is a mix of centralization and 
decentralization in Switzerland, where there is no minimum wage legislation, 
and many collective bargaining  agreements  do not  mention pay,  but parties 
are encouraged to form associations, leaving open the possibility  of  de facto 
centralization (Wrong 1987). While we have no explicit information on Hun- 
gary, we assume that as a (then) Communist country, albeit a somewhat more 
market-oriented  one,  it  most  likely  had  relatively  centralized  wage- 
determination institutions. 
Wage setting is clearly very centralized in the Scandinavian countries, where 
the great majority of workers (64-80  percent in our micro data) are unionized 
and the collective bargaining process is very centralized. For example, in Swe- 
den and Norway, the major union federation (LO) signs an agreement with the 
employers (SAF) covering a major portion of the labor force.h Several changes 
in  collective bargaining practices, both  gender  specific and general, helped 
reduce the Swedish gender pay gap (Lofstrom and Gustafsson  1991). From 
1960 to 1965, labor and management phased out the system of separate wage 
schedules for men and women that had previously existed in Swedish collec- 
tive bargaining agreements. In addition, from 1968 to  1974, the LO made a 
conscious effort to raise the relative wages of  lower-paid workers, regardless 
of gender. Finally, in  1977, the LO and the SAF negotiated  a comprehensive 
package of equal employment provisions, predating the  1980 passage of for- 
mal EEO legislation. 
German and Austrian  wage-determination institutions are also highly cen- 
tralized, and Austrian pay setting in particular appears to resemble that of Swe- 
den and Norway. While a smaller percentage of Austrian workers are unionized 
than in Scandinavia (table 3A.2), collective bargaining agreements in Austria 
in most cases cover an entire industry or group of industries throughout the 
country. There thus appears to be little room for interfirm differentials in nego- 
tiated wages among union workers. Further, the terms of such agreements ex- 
tend to nonunion workers (Tomandl and Fuerboeck 1986). 
While collective bargaining in Germany is less centralized than in Austria, 
it is undoubtedly more centralized than in the United States. Unlike the U.S. 
emphasis on single-firm agreements, contracts usually cover all employers in 
an  industry  in  a  state  (Kennedy  1982). As  in  Austria,  the  terms  of  such 
agreements extend to nonunion workers.  In contrast to Austria, however, na- 
tionwide agreements and interindustry contracts are rare. 
While the Australian wage-setting process is also highly centralized, it dif- 
fers considerably from those of the countries described above. In Australia, 
6. While wage setting is still far more centralized in these countries than in other European 
nations, there were some signs that the system was becoming less centralized in the 1980s (Leion 
1985; Thorsrud 1985). 117  The Gender Earnings Gap: Some International Evidence 
minimum wage rates for occupations are set by  government tribunals.’  Cur- 
rently, nearly 90 percent of employees are covered by tribunal awards. Until 
World War 11, female award rates were set at 54 percent of male rates; in 1950, 
this was raised to 75 percent. From 1969 to 1972, the concept of equal pay for 
equal work was implemented, as the female award rate was raised to 100 per- 
cent of the male rate for the same job. Finally, in  1972, the federal tribunal 
moved to the comparable worth concept so that women in female occupations 
would also be covered by rulings on the minimum male award in other occupa- 
tioms The raw data in figure 3.1 above as well as some econometric evidence 
(e.g., Gregory and Daly 1991) suggest that these gender-specific policies im- 
plemented by  the wage courts have played an important role in lowering the 
Pay gap- 
Wage determination in Italy is also a very centralized process and has in- 
cluded explicit attempts to narrow pay differentials in a manner similar to that 
in Scandinavia. First, while about 40 percent of the Italian labor force in 1985 
was unionized (Bean and Holden 1992), labor courts in Italy are empowered 
to extend the terms of collective bargaining agreements to nonunion workers 
(Treu  1990), most likely yielding an  effective degree of  unionization that is 
considerably greater. Second, and more important for understanding the Italian 
wage structure, is the operation of the wage indexation system, known as the 
scala mobile. This system, in existence from 1975 to 1992, gave across-the- 
board lira increases in wages in response to inflation in a conscious attempt to 
reduced  skilled-nonskilled pay  differentials (Treu  1990; “Italy”  1992). By 
1990, Italian employers claimed that accumulated indexation payments  ac- 
counted for 40 percent of labor costs? 
Wage setting in Britain appears to be less centralized than in the countries 
reviewed above, but it is most likely more centralized than in the United States. 
Roughly 40-50  percent of British workers are in unions, suggesting a larger 
role for unions and the collective bargaining process in Britain. In other re- 
spects, the wage-setting process appears similar to that of the United States. In 
the British private sector in 1980, only 26 percent of  all (union and nonunion) 
workers had their wages set in multiemployer contracts or by wages councils. 
The rest were covered by single-firm agreements or had wages determined by 
management (Sisson and Brown 1983). Similarly, government intervention in 
British pay setting has been largely limited to periods in which incomes poli- 
cies limited overall wage increases, and reliance on such policies waned in the 
1980s (Davies 1983). 
In an econometric analysis that controlled for other factors affecting wom- 
7. This description of Australian pay  setting is based on Gregory and Daly (1991) and Kill- 
8. While about 40 percent of workers are covered by  federal (as compared to state or other) 
9. See “New Industrial Relations Talks Continue” (1990.7). 
ingsworth (1990). 
awards, these other tribunals often follow the federal lead (Killingsworth 1990). 118  Francine D. Blau and Lawrence M. Kahn 
en's relative pay, Zabalza and Tzannatos (1985) found significant effects for the 
1970 equal pay legislation. This legislation was implemented through collec- 
tive agreements (it was not until 1975 that the labor market was more broadly 
covered). The legislation required not only that differentiated male and female 
rates be removed but also that, in workplaces covered by collective agreements, 
women could not be paid at less than the lowest male rate (OECD 1988; Za- 
balza and Tzannatos 1985). Thus, the effect of the law was in part to raise the 
minimum for women covered by collective bargaining. 
3.3  Earnings Ratios in the Micro Data 
Our principal data source for the study of individual countries is the Interna- 
tional Social Survey Programme (ISSP) data. The following countries and time 
periods were used: Austria (1985-87),  West  Germany (1985-88),  Hungary 
(1986-88),  Switzerland  (1987),  the  United  Kingdom  (1985-88),  and  the 
United States (1985-88).  The 1985-88  ISSP files lack data on the Scandina- 
vian countries, and preliminary results suggested that the Australian data in the 
ISSP were inconsistent with other sources and that the Italian ISSP data con- 
tained very few observations on women. We therefore supplemented the ISSP 
with three additional micro-data sets in order to include these countries with 
very high gender earnings ratios. We used the Class Structure and Class Con- 
sciousness (CSCC) data base, originally compiled by Erik Wright, for Sweden 
(1980) and Norway (1982); the Income Distribution Survey (IDS) for Australia 
(1986); and a Bank of  Italy (BI) survey for Italy (1987).1° In each case, the 
sample was restricted to individuals aged eighteen to sixty-five years old. 
The specific earnings measures used in the data for each country are de- 
scribed in detail in the appendix. In each case, the earnings figure is expressed 
on an annual or a monthly basis. The computation of gender wage differentials 
from these data sets is complicated by the omission from these files of informa- 
tion on annual weeks worked. Weekly hours worked is available, however, 
allowing for some adjustment of the earnings data for time input.I' (The adjust- 
ment for time input is described below.) In all but two cases, the earnings vari- 
able was  coded into categories.I2 In the analyses presented below, we  arbi- 
10. For descriptions of ISSP data, see Blanchflower and Freeman (1992);  of CSCC data, Rosen- 
feld and Kalleberg (1990); of IDS data, Blackburn and Bloom (1991); and of BI data, Erickson 
and Ichino (chap. 8 in this volume). 
11. There is information on weeks worked for Australia and for a subset of the Norwegian data. 
Analyses correcting for weeks worked yielded very similar results to those reported here, with 
slightly lower adjusted gender differentials. Lack of information on hours worked for those with 
multiple jobs forced us to limit the Swedish sample to those with one job only. 
12. The Australian earnings data were originally reported as a continuous variable. However, to 
maintain comparability  with the  other countries,  we  recoded  the Australian  earnings  into the 
ISSP's intervals for Australia. When the analysis was performed for Australia using the original 
continuous variable, the results were virtually identical to those reported here. The BI data were 
also continuous but did not match up with the ISSP categories for Italy. We therefore used the 
continuous earnings variable for Italy. As noted below, Italy's wage distribution had lower residual 119  The Gender Earnings Gap: Some International Evidence 
trarily coded the top (open-ended) category as 1.2 times its minimum value. 
However, the gender ratios were virtually identical when we experimented 
with alternative assumptions for the top category ranging from 1 to 1.5 times 
its minimum value. Finally, concern for adequate sample size led us to pool 
years of  data for those countries in the ISSP surveyed more than once (see 
above). 
3.3.1 
Table 3.3 gives estimated gender ratios for log earnings corrected for hours 
for all workers and by  marital status. These estimates were obtained as follows. 
For each country, the following regression was run separately by sex:I3 
(1)  In EARN = b, + b,PART + b,HPART  + b,HFULL + B‘X + e, 
where In EARN is the natural log of earnings; PART is a dummy variable for 
part-time employment (fewer than thirty-five hours per week); HPART and 
HFULL are interactions of weekly work hours with part- and full-time status; 
X  is a vector of  explanatory variables including years of  schooling, potential 
experience and its square, union mernbership,l4  and industry and occupation 
dummy variables; and e is an error term. (For the variable means and regres- 
sion results, see the appendix.) The model allows for both a part-time shift 
term and different slopes for hours for part- and full-time workers. A detailed 
adjustment for part-time employment is important in light of the prevalence of 
part-time work for women in many countries (see below). 
The PART, HPART, and HFULL coefficients from (1) were used to adjust 
each person’s earnings for work hours by  assuming a forty-hour work week. 
That is, for each worker i, we have: 
(2)  YFULL, = In EARN, -  b,PART, -  b,HPART, -  b,(HFULL, -  40), 
where the coefficients, b,, are obtained from estimating equation (1) for males 
and females separately. Gross hours-corrected gender earnings ratios based on 
the mean of YFULL for the indicated groups were then calculated for each 
country and are shown in table 3.3. 
In  the first column are the hours-corrected gender earnings ratios for all 
workers shown in figure 3.2 above. The last two columns of table 3.3 provide 
Estimation of the Gender Differentials 
variance than in most of the other countries. Use of  earnings categories for these other countries 
implies that Italy’s residual variance would have been even lower relative to the others had earnings 
categories been used for Italy as well. 
13. For counmes with more than one year of data, the log earnings variable was obtained by 
transforming each observation into its 1988 (or end-year) equivalent on the basis of regressions 
including only gender and year dummy variables. Thus, the dependent variable for each observa- 
tion on individual i in year t is In  EARN,, -  P,b,YR,,,  where In  EARN,,  is the observed log earnings 
for individual i in year t, YR,, and b, are the dummy variable and the estimated coefficient for year 
t, respectively, and the end year is the omitted year. 
14. Union status was not available for Italy or  Australia. 120  Francine D. Blau and Lawrence M. Kahn 
Table 3.3  Gender Earnings Ratios Corrected for Hours” 
All Workers 
Own Country  U.S. Family  Married  Single 
















































”YFULL, earnings evaluated at full-time (forty) hours (see eq. [2]). The number of  hours is not 
available for Hungary, but all workers are full-time. Marital status is not available for Italy. 
bComputed using U.S.  proportions of married and single workers. 
gender ratios for married and for single workers ~eparate1y.l~  It is well known 
that the family division of labor can influence pay gaps by  affecting women’s 
(and men’s) investments in human capital, accumulation of seniority and expe- 
rience, and job search strategies.I6 Except for Hungary, for which we have no 
data on hours, the pay ratio is relatively high among single workers, ranging 
from .83 to .98.17  Further, the rankings of the pay gaps for single workers are 
not always consistent with the overall rankings. In contrast, the pay gap is much 
larger for married workers and corresponds more consistently to the rankings 
for the overall labor force. Nonetheless, since the ratios for married workers 
are always lower than those for single workers, a question may be raised as to 
whether the overall differences  in ratios across countries are simply due to 
intercountry differences in family composition. This appears not to be the case, 
however. In the second column of table 3.3, the earnings ratios for all workers 
are computed using the U.S. proportions of married and single workers. The 
implied ratios are similar to those for all workers  in the first column of the 
15. Note that eq. (1).  which is used to obtain hours-corrected earnings for each individual, 
does not control for marital status. This specification was employed because of the complications 
involved in considering marital status as a productivity indicator for men and women (see our 
discussion below). We do, however, provide additional results for a subsample of married workers, 
a strategy that in effect controls for marital status. 
16. The division of  labor in the home can also of course be affected by women’s relative labor 
market opportunities. Nonetheless, we would still expect the division of labor to have some effect 
on relative pay. 
17. Reasons for the low estimated pay gaps among single workers include the likelihood that 
they are disproportionately young (the pay gap is lower for young workers [see Mincer and Pola- 
chek  19741) and that single males are less productive than married males (see Korenman and 
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table. This similarity suggests that cross-country differences in the family com- 
position of the labor force do not account for the observed differences in rela- 
tive pay gaps. Rather, as concluded above, it is the intercountry differences in 
the ratios particularly among mamed workers that drive the international dif- 
ferences. 
3.3.2  Gender Differences in Worker Characteristics 
The data presented in table 3.3 suggest that international differences in the 
gender pay gap are not due to differences in marital status composition. Before 
providing a formal decomposition of these pay gaps, we briefly examine inter- 
country differences in other worker characteristics. Such data can reveal at least 
qualitative differences in the relative labor market skills of women across coun- 
tries. Overall, we conclude that U.S. women compare favorably with those in 
other countries when we consider their labor market qualifications relative to 
those of men. 
For all countries except Switzerland and Italy, education and potential expe- 
rience are similar for men and women (see table 3A.2). In  Switzerland, the 
female labor force is less educated and younger than the male labor force, 
while, in Italy, women are more highly educated and younger than men. While 
unfortunately we lack data on actual labor market experience, some indication 
of labor force commitment may be gained by an examination of the labor force 
participation (LFP) rates by  gender-marital  status groups for each country 
shown in table 3.4. As may be seen in the table, the LFP rate of women in the 
United States is higher than that of women in any of the other countries except 
Sweden. The absolute male-female differential in participation rates in the 
United States is comparable to that in Hungary and lower than that in any of 
the other countries apart from Sweden. 
While the U.S. female population has higher labor force participation than 
most other countries in the 1980s, this does not necessarily imply that the aver- 
age employed American woman has more labor market experience. It is pos- 
sible that, in a country with a high female LFP rate, recent entrants constitute 
a high proportion of  the labor force and thus that women workers have  less 
experience on average than in a country with a low female LFP rate. On the 
other hand, it is possible that a country’s high female LFP rate is due to a 
more continuous labor force attachment among women (Blau and Ferber 1992; 
Polachek 1990). 
Polachek (1990) in fact finds that, in the 1970s, a growing female LFP rate 
in the United States was associated with a rising gender gap in actual experi- 
ence. This finding was due to the low experience levels of the large number of 
new entrants (or reentrants). However, by the 1980s, rising female LFP rates 
in the United States were accompanied by  rising female relative experience 
levels. Lacking international data on actual experience, we  tentatively con- 
clude that U.S. women are at least as oriented toward market work as women 
in most other countries. 
This conclusion is reinforced by  an examination of  the incidence of  part- 122  Francine D. Blau and Lawrence M. Kahn 
Table 3.4  Labor Force Participation Rates 
Men  Women 





































































Sources:  Sweden: 
(1990,299). 
Lofstrom  and  Gustafsson  (1991). Italy:  OECD, Labour  Force  Srarisrics, 
time work shown in table 3.5. A smaller percentage of employed women in the 
United States than in any other country work part-time (fewer than thirty-five 
hours per week). Further, since the incidence of part-time work among men is 
considerably  higher in the United States than  in other countries, the gender 
differential in part-time work is much smaller in the United States than else- 
where. We particularly note the high incidence of part-time work among Scan- 
dinavian women. About 46 percent of Swedish and 53 percent of Norwegian 
employed women work part-time, compared to only 24 percent of employed 
U.S. women.18 Finally, while the incidence of part-time work is only slightly 
higher for Italian than for U.S. women, the Italian  female LFP rate is much 
lower than that in the United States (table 3.4 above). 
The commitment of U.S. women to market work is further underscored by 
the examination  of  the  incidence  of  part-time  work  by  marital  status  also 
shown in table 3.5. In all countries, married women are more likely to work 
part-time than single women, and single men generally have a higher incidence 
of  part-time work than married men. However, U.S. manied women  are far 
less likely to work part-time than those in any other country, while U.S. mar- 
ried men are slightly more likely to work part-time than those elsewhere. In 
addition, the gap in the incidence of part-time work between married and sin- 
gle women is only about .  10 in the United States, while it ranges from .24 to 
.36 elsewhere. 
Tables 3.4 and 3.5 suggest a higher level of relative labor force commitment 
18. The high incidence of PART for Scandinavian women may be due in part to the generous 
family leave policies in these countries. In addition to policies guaranteeing paid parental leave in 
both Sweden and Norway, since 1979 Sweden has allowed working parents of small children the 
right to have a six-hour day on demand (Haavio-Mannila and Kauppinen 1992). 123  The Gender Earnings Gap: Some International Evidence 
Table 3.5  Means for Married, Spouse Present (MARSP) and Part-Time Work 
(PART), Employed Sample 
Part-Time (PART) 
Married 
(MARSP)  Men  Women 














































































Nore: PART is defined as employed for fewer than thirty-five hours per week. This variable is not 
available for Hungary. Marital status is not available for Italy. 
among U.S. women, particularly married women, than among women in most 
other countries. Table 3.6 indicates a lower level of  occupational segregation 
(at the one-digit level of aggregation) for U.S. women than for those in other 
countries (with the exception of Switzerland).’9 Industrial segregation, again 
measured at the one digit level, is similar in the U.S. to that in the other coun- 
tries in the sample. The high levels of occupational and industrial segregation 
in Scandinavia are especially noteworthy and perhaps understandable in light 
of the high incidence of part-time work there. 
A country’s level of occupational segregation is likely to reflect both wom- 
en’s relative training levels and labor force commitment and the effect of em- 
ployer, government, or union policies (Reskin et al.  1986; Blau  and Ferber 
1992). To the extent that it reflects training and commitment, we may again 
conclude  that  U.S.  women’s  workforce  credentials  relative  to men’s  exceed 
those of women in other countries. 
3.3.3  Analysis of International Differences in the Pay Gap: The Effects of 
Skills, the Treatment of Women, and Overall Inequality 
Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce (1991) have devised a method that allows us to 
decompose the international differences in gender pay gaps into a portion due 
to gender-specific factors and a portion due to differences in the overall level 
19. This conclusion regarding the U.S. position largely holds true when the segregation index 
is calculated using published data from the ILO (Blau and Ferber 1992, 309). Note that our find- 
ings for Switzerland must be interpreted with caution given the small size of our sample. A segre- 
gation index computed on the basis of ILO data does not indicate a lower level of segregation for 
Switzerland than for the United States. 124  Francine D. BIau and Lawrence M. Kahn 
Table 3.6  Gender Segregation Indexes by One-Digit Occupation and Industry 
Country  Occupation  Industry 
Australia  ,3807  ,3302 
Austria  ,4020  ,3140 
Germany  .4216  ,3203 
Hungary  .4084  ,2467 
Norway  ,4341  ,3893 
Sweden  ,4614  ,4263 
Switzerland  .3222  .29  13 
United Kingdom  ,4395  .3488 
United States  .3568  ,3430 
of  wage inequality. Following their notation, suppose that we  have for male 
worker i and country j a male wage equation: 
(3)  xj = X,Bj + ujO,, 
where qJ is the log of wages; X,, is a vector of  explanatory variables; B, is a 
vector of coefficients; 0,,  is a standardized residual (i.e., with mean zero and 
variance one for each country); and a, is the country’s residual standard devia- 
tion of wages (i.e., its level of male residual wage inequality). 
Then the male-female log wage gap for country j is 
(4)  D,  = Y,,,, -  Y~ = sxp, + u,se,, 
where the m and f subscripts refer to male and female averages, respectively; 
and a 6 prefix signifies the average male-female difference for the variable 
immediately following. Equation (4) states that the country’s pay gap can be 
decomposed into differences in measured qualifications (fix,)  and differences 
in the standardized residual (Se,) multiplied by the money value per unit differ- 
ence in the standardized residual (u,).’~  Note that the final term of  (4) corre- 
sponds to the “unexplained” differential in a standard decomposition of  the 
gender differential when the contribution of the means is evaluated using the 
male function. 
The pay gap difference between two countries j and k can then be decom- 
posed using (4): 
(5)  0,  -  D,  = (SX, -  6X,)B, + SX,(B, -  B,) + 
(60, -  se,)u,  + seJ(u,  -  a,). 
20. Note that this formulation is based on a single wage equation for males. That is, one could 
repeat the analysis starting with a female wage equation. Male-female differences in regression 
coefficients can reflect either discrimination or sex-correlated measurement errors of  variables 
such as experience. In using the male wage equation for this decomposition analysis, we in effect 
simulate what the wage equation in a nondiscriminatory labor market would look like (although 
the elimination of discrimination might change the male as well as the female reward structure). 
We present both male and female wage equations for each country in the appendix. 125  The Gender Earnings Gap: Some International Evidence 
The first term in (5)  reflects the contribution of intercountry differences in ob- 
served labor market qualifications (;r) to the gender gap. For example, the pay 
gap in one country may be less than in another owing to women’s higher rela- 
tive levels of education. The second term reflects the effect of  different mea- 
sured prices across countries for observed labor market qualifications. For ex- 
ample, for a given  (positive)  male-female  difference  in  schooling, a higher 
return to education will raise the male-female pay gap. 
The third term measures the effect of international differences in the relative 
wage positions of men and women after controlling for measured characteris- 
tics (i.e., whether women rank higher or lower within the male residual wage 
distribution). That is, it gives the contribution to the cross-country difference 
in the gender gap that would result if the two countries had the same levels of 
residual male wage inequality and differed only in their percentile rankings of 
the female wage residuals. In one country, for instance, the average woman’s 
wage residual  may  be  at the  thirty-fifth  percentile  of the male  distribution, 
while in another it may be at only the twenty-fifth percentile. This percentile 
ranking may reflect gender differences  in unmeasured  characteristics and/or 
the effect of labor market discrimination against women. In the empirical work 
that follows, we label this term the gap effect. 
Finally, the fourth term of (5) reflects intercountry differences  in residual 
inequality.  It  measures  the  contribution  to  the  intercountry  difference  that 
would result if  two countries had the same percentile rankings of  the female 
wage residuals and differed only in the extent of male residual wage inequality. 
Suppose, as is likely, that, controlling for measured characteristics, the female 
mean log wage is less than the male mean in countryj. Then the larger is the 
intercountry difference in the overall residual inequality in wages (a, - a,), 
the larger difference there will be in the ultimate pay gaps in the two countries. 
That is, unmeasured deficits in female relative skills or discrimination lower 
women’s position in the  male distribution of wage residuals. The larger the 
penalty a country places on being below average in wages, the larger will be 
its pay  gap. In the  empirical work below, we label this the  effect of  unob- 
served prices. 
Following Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce (1991), we estimate the third and fourth 
terms of  (5) empirically using the entire distributions of  wage residuals for 
each  country. For example, to compute  (SO, - SO,)a,, we  first give each 
woman  in country j  a percentile number based  on the ranking of  her wage 
residual (from the country j  male wage regression) in country j’s distribution 
of male wage residuals. We then impute each country j  woman’s wage residual 
given her percentile ranking in country j  and the distribution of  male wage 
residuals in country k. The difference between the mean of these imputed wage 
residuals for countryj and the actual mean female wage residual for country k 
is used to find the estimate of (SO, -  SO,)a, (note that the mean male residual 
is always zero). The fourth term of (9,  SOj(u, -  UJ,  is obtained analogously. 
According to (5),  the full effect of gender-specific factors is reflected in the 126  Francine D. Blau and Lawrence M. Kahn 
sum of the first and third terms, the effect of gender differences in qualifications 
and of gender differences in wage rankings at a given level of measured charac- 
teristics. Labor market structure is reflected in the sum of the second and fourth 
terms, the effect of intercountry differences in returns to measured and unmeas- 
ured characteristics. Within the framework of a traditional decomposition, the 
sum of the third and fourth terms represents the effect of intercountry differ- 
ences in the “unexplained” differential, which is commonly taken as an esti- 
mate of discrimination. 
The possibility of discrimination complicates the interpretation of  the last 
term of (5). With labor market discrimination, this term in part reflects the 
interaction  between  country j’s  level of  discrimination  (defined as pushing 
women down the distribution  of wages) and intercountry differences in the 
overall level of inequality that determine how large the penalty is for that lower 
position in the distribution (Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce 1991). We will present 
some indirect evidence that, in the case of  the countries compared here, this 
term at least in part reflects the effect of overall wage setting. The observed 
price  effect  may  also  reflect  discrimination  if,  for  example,  women  are 
“crowded” by exclusion into certain sectors, lowering relative earnings there 
even for men (Bergmann 1974). 
We  implement this  decomposition using  the  Juhn,  Murphy, and  Pierce 
(1991) accounting method performed on equation (1). Each country’s gross 
gender differential is expressed in terms of YFULL, hours corrected earnings 
defined in equation (2).  The explanatory variables in X include the traditional 
human  capital  variables  of  education, potential  experience and  its  square, 
union membership, and one-digit industry and occupation dummy variables.*’ 
The structural variables may reflect both worker skills and rents received by 
workers with these characteristics. Unfortunately, the data sets available to us 
lack information on actual labor market experience. Thus, this remains an im- 
portant omitted variable in these analyses, although, to some degree, our con- 
trols for education, hours, industry, and occupation may pick up some of the 
effects of such omissions. 
We have not controlled for marital status in this analysis, although, as noted 
above, it may be an important factor influencing the pay  gap. An alternative 
would have been to include marital status as a productivity characteristic. How- 
ever, such an approach is problematic since this variable appears to measure 
higher skills for men (Korenman and Neumark  1991) but most likely lower 
skills for women, especially when data on actual labor market experience are 
lacking. The approach that we have followed allows us to place a sharper inter- 
pretation in the decomposition on the effect of differences in  labor market 
skills. Recognizing the potential importance of marital status, however, we also 
21. For Hungary, Australia, and Italy, industry and/or occupation differ from those for the rest 
of the countries. In addition, for the latter two, union membership status is not available. For the 
purposes of comparing the United States and these countries, we estimated U.S. equations that 
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perform a decomposition of pay gaps among married workers. Differences in 
the results for the whole labor force and those for married workers can provide 
interesting insights in cross-country comparisons. Sample size limitations pre- 
vented us from analyzing single workers. 
The decomposition for the whole labor force is summarized in table 3.7, and 
that for married workers (based on eq. [  11 estimated for married workers only) 
is presented in table 3.8 below. Looking first at the results for the whole work- 
force (table 3.7), we see that, after controlling for measured characteristics, the 
mean female percentile** ranges from 21.2  in Germany to about 37 in the 
United States, Australia, Sweden, and Italy. It is noteworthy that U.S. (and 
Italian) women place at the top of the list. The column headed gap shows the 
contribution of  each country's female placement in the male residual wage 
distribution to its relative pay gap. The figure is positive for all countries except 
Australia and Italy,23  indicating that these differences in rankings raise the dif- 
ferential relative to the United States, often substantially (the unweighted aver- 
age effect is .1886). The column headed unobserved prices shows that the 
lower level of  residual wage inequality in  each of  the other countries has a 
negative effect, often quite considerable, on its gap relative to that in the United 
States (the unweighted average effect is -.2015). 
Table 3.7 also provides estimates of the effect of measured skills and their 
prices on intercountry differences in the pay  gap. The observed Xs effect is 
generally positive, indicating that U.S.  women have relatively favorable levels 
of  the measured variables (the unweighted average effect is .0286). The ob- 
served prices effect is always negative, indicating that the male returns to the 
explanatory variables increase the pay gap in the United States relative to other 
countries (the unweighted average effect is -  .0699). However, these observed 
effects are much smaller in magnitude than the unobserved prices and gap ef- 
fects. 
The last two columns of the lower panel of table 3.7 give the total effect of 
gender-specific factors  and  wage  structure. The  results  suggest that  U.S. 
women fare well with respect to gender-specific factors (as measured by  the 
sum of the observed Xs  and the gap effects). When compared to all countries 
except Italy, Australia, and Sweden, U.S. women have relatively favorable lev- 
els of  both productivity characteristics and gender-specific treatment in the 
labor  market.  For  these  three  countries,  the  gender-specific factors  (i.e., 
the observed Xs and the gap effects) approximately cancel out. In contrast, the 
22. For each country, this is the mean of the percentile ranking of each woman's residual from 
the male regression (eg)  in the distribution of male wage residuals (eJ. 
23. Although in both table 3.7 and table 3.8 (below) the mean female percentile is highest in 
the United States, there are  a few instances in which the gap effect is negative. This reflects (1) 
our use of  the whole distribution in computing the percentiles and the gap effects that can result 
in such inconsistencies and (2) our use of  alternative specifications for the US. wage regression 
to compare the United States to countries for which we were not able to include the same industry, 
occupation, or union status variables, which occasionally resulted in a slightly lower percentile 
for the United States than for the country in question. 128  Francine D. Blau and Lawrence M. Kahn 
Table 3.7  Analysis of Log Wages (YFULL): All Workers 
Mean 
Female  Female Residual  Male Residual  Female Residual 
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-  ,0666 
-.3587 
Note: Regressions include controls for education, potential experience and its square, union status, and 
occupation and industry dummy variables. The U.S. value used to calculate D2 - D,,,  for Hungary, 
Australia, and Italy is based on hours corrections from U.S. regressions that conform to the specifications 
for each of  those countries. However, the U.S. value in the D  column is based on  the  more detailed 
specification permitted by  the ISSP and CSCC data files. 
"The gender difference in YFULL, earnings evaluated at full-time (forty) hours (see eq. [2]). 
bThe mean female residual percentile in the male distribution of wage residuals. 
=The  sum of the observed X's and gap effects. 
dThe  sum of  the observed and unobserved prices effects. 
U.S. level of  inequality  (reflected in the sum of  observed prices and unob- 
served prices effects) greatly raises its gender pay gap compared to each of the 
other countries in the sample. This inequality effect is sufficient or more than 
sufficient to account for the higher pay gap in the United States than in the six 
countries with the smaller gaps. 
The conclusions for married women (table 3.8) are similar to those for all 
workers. U.S. women again have the highest percentile ranking, yet the pay 
gap is larger in the United  States than in all the other countries except the 
United Kingdom.24  We  again find that the U.S. level of inequality raises its 
24. Marital status is not available for Italy. 129  The Gender Earnings Gap: Some International Evidence 
Table 3.8  Analysis of Log Wages (YFULL): Married Workers 
~~ 
Mean 
Female  Female Residual  Male Residual  Female Residual 


















-  .3966 
-.4817 
-  .4462 
-.3435 
-  ,2536 
-  ,4587 






























-  ,2843 
.O 107 
... 
Observed  Unobserved  Sum Gender  Sum Wage 








.05  13  -.0578  -  ,0958  -  ,0598  -  .0445  -.I176 
,0509  -.I251  ,2142  -.2826  ,265  1  -  ,4077 
,0145  -.0924  ,4740  -.4573  ,4885  -  ,5497 
-  .028  1  -.0168  ,4997  -.5248  ,4716  -.5416 
-.0102  -.0483  .1129  -.2344  ,1027  -.2827 
-  ,0307  -  ,0422  -  ,0279  -  .  I835  -.0586  -.2257 
,0040  ,0130  ,3170  -.3233  ,3210  -.3103 
Nore: Regressions include controls for education, potential experience and its square, union status, and 
occupation and  industry dummy variables. The US. value used to calculate D, -  DUSA  for Hungary, 
Australia, and Italy is based on hours corrections from U.S. regressions that conform to the specifications 
for each of  those countries. However, the US. value in the D column  is based on the more detailed 
specification permitted by the ISSP and CSCC data files. 
aThe gender difference in YFLTLL, earnings evaluated at full-time (forty) hours (see eq. [2]). 
bThe mean-female residual percentile in the male distribution of wage residuals. 
‘The sum of the observed X’s and gap effects. 
dThe sum of the observed and unobserved prices effects. 
pay gap while gender-specific factors usually lower it. With the exception of 
Australia and Sweden, higher U.S.  inequality (i.e., wage structure) is sufficient 
or more than sufficient to explain the higher pay gap in the United States com- 
pared to the countries with smaller differentials. In the case of Australia and 
Sweden, US. inequality accounts for 72-79  percent of  the difference in the 
married worker pay gap. One interpretation of the moderate difference between 
these results and the results for all workers (where inequality accounted for 
100 percent of the cross-country difference) is that the types of gender-related 
interventions in Sweden and Australia (discussed above) have had a dispropor- 
tionate effect on married workers.  Parental  leave (Sweden)  and comparable 
worth  (Australia) may  have especially  large positive  effects  on the relative 
earnings of married women. 
An additional point of interest is that, in both tables 3.7 and 3.8, the residual 130  Francine D. Blau and Lawrence M. Kahn 
standard deviation of the wage regressions is considerably higher for U.S. men 
and women than for men and women in other countries (the female residual 
standard deviation is computed from a female wage regression). Across all the 
countries in the sample, the correlation coefficient between the male and the 
female standard deviations is .9344.  The fact that the male and female standard 
deviations seem to move together in this manner adds credibility to our frame- 
work in which a country’s overall level of inequality is assumed to affect both 
men and women.2J  Other than the United States, the residual standard deviation 
is higher for Australia than for the other countries. This occurs despite the 
Australian tradition of administered wages. This suggests that actual earnings 
may deviate from award levels, which are intended to be the minimum rates.26 
The striking finding of tables 3.7 and 3.8 is the importance of wage structure 
in explaining international differences in the gender gap. However, as noted 
earlier, what we have labeled wage inequality could also reflect the effect of 
labor market discrimination. What are we thus to conclude about labor market 
structure? From a number of indirect indicators, we conclude that  it is im- 
portant, even though it may not be possible to estimate its effect precisely. 
First, our review of wage-setting institutions in each country strongly sug- 
gests that the U.S. system is considerably less centralized than those in other 
countries, thus making a finding of the importance of wage structure plausible. 
Second, the United States has had a longer and often stronger commitment to 
equal pay and equal employment opportunity policies than most other coun- 
tries in our sample.27 Further, U.S.  women compare favorably to women  in 
other countries in terms of their qualifications and occupational status relative 
to men. Thus, it is credible that gender-specific factors do not explain the rela- 
tively high pay gap in the United States. Third, we found that residual wage 
variation (and, in results not shown, wage variation) of both men and women 
in the United States considerably  exceeds that of  the same gender group in 
other countries. Similarly, across all countries, female and male wage and re- 
sidual wage variation  were found to be highly correlated. This suggests that 
the same set of  factors-measured  and unmeasured prices and wage-setting 
institutions-affects  the wages of both men and women in each country in a 
similar way.  Finally, and perhaps most important, even though the estimated 
wage inequality effect may  include the effect of  gender discrimination as it 
interacts with wage structure, our findings nonetheless suggest an extremely 
important role for wage inequality in affecting the gender ratio. 
25. The standard deviation of gross hours corrected earnings (YFULL) is also higher in the 
United States than elsewhere (results not shown). Similarly, across all countries, the correlation of 
the male and female standard deviations is ,9647. 
26.  According to Watts and Mitchell (1990), the Australian wage award system allows for con- 
siderable variability in actual earnings. Such variations can be  achieved by  promotions. In the 
1980s, the dispersion in actual earnings appeared to increase, despite the imposition of  awards 
with uniform percentage wage increases. 
27. A primary exception is the comparable worth approach pursued in Australia, which might 
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3.4  Swimming Upstream: U.S. Women and the Male Wage 
Distribution, 1971-88 
Figure 3.1 above shows that, in the 1980s, the gender pay gap in the United 
States narrowed considerably, following a long period of relative stability. In 
addition, as noted above, labor market inequality has been increasing in the 
United  States in  recent  years.  The analysis  reported  above indicated  that 
the high level of  U.S. wage inequality has raised its gender pay  gap com- 
pared to that in other countries. This finding, in conjunction with these time- 
series features of the U.S. labor market, implies that U.S. women have been 
swimming  against  a  current  of  rising  inequality.  The  falling  gender  gap 
in the United States becomes even more impressive in light of these recent 
trends. 
To provide some evidence on the degree to which growing inequality has 
retarded the progress of  women’s relative pay  in the United States, we have 
included some analyses of  wages from the period 1971-88.  Specifically, we 
have examined the log of real weekly wages for full-time workers using data 
from the 1972, 1982, and 1989 Current Population Surveys. This information 
refers  to earnings in  1971, 1981, and  1988, respectively. Earnings are ex- 
pressed in 198  1 dollars using the consumer price index. 
Trends in the pay gap and in the wage distribution for these years are de- 
scribed in the upper panel of table 3.9. During this time, women moved stead- 
ily up the distribution of male wages, from an average percentile of  19.53 in 
1971 to a figure of  30.41 for 1988$* the pace of  this upward movement in- 
creased in the  1980s. The gender pay  differential also fell during both the 
1971-81  and the 1981-88  periods, with some acceleration after 1981. (Figure 
3.1 shows similar trends.) The declining gender gap reflected a combination of 
falling male and rising female real wages over the period 1971-88. 
Table 3.9 also indicates that the standard deviations of the log of female and 
the log of male real earnings both rose in the 1980s; from 1971 to 1981, how- 
ever, only male variability increased. Katz and Murphy (1992) found similar 
male and female patterns for changes in overall wage inequality. Such results 
could imply that the wage structure widened for both men and women in the 
1980s but only for men in the  1970s, calling into question (at least for the 
1970s) our approach based on male inequality. However, changes in the varia- 
tion in log wages are not the same as changes in the wage structure since the 
former can be affected by changes in the distribution of productive characteris- 
tics as well as in skill prices. Katz and Murphy (1992) in fact found that resid- 
ual wage inequality rose steadily and at similar rates for both men and women 
in both the 1970s and the 1980s. These findings do suggest that similar pro- 
28. This latter figure is roughly similar to our results for gross hours corrected earnings from 
the ISSP (33.2) given in figure 3.3 above, providing further confirmation of  the ISSPs representa- 
tiveness. 132  Francine D. Blau and Lawrence M. Kahn 
Table 3.9  Analysis of Log Real Weekly Wages for Full-Time Workers, United 
States, 1971-88 (1981 dollars) 
1971  1981  1988 
Mean-female percentile 
Ln(  wage): 
in male distribution  19.53  24.06  30.41 
Males  5.9800  5.8857  5.9003 
Females  5.4360  5.4148  5.5298 
(.4754)  (.4773)  (S354) 
Differential  .5440  .4709  .37OS 
(.5 123)  (.5493)  (391) 
Decomposition of Changes 
Total Change  Due to Change  Due to Change 
in ln(wage)  in Female Percentile  in Male Inequality 
1971-8 1  -  ,073  1 
1981-88  -.lo04 
1971-88  -.1735 
-.1143 
-.1251 




cesses were at work for both men and women in the United States during this 
period.29 
The lower panel of table 3.9 provides a decomposition of changes in the pay 
gap into portions due to women’s movement up the male distribution and por- 
tions due to changes in male inequality. The stories for the two subperiods are 
similar: had the overall degree of inequality not risen, the pay gap would have 
closed faster than it in fact did. Taking the period  1971-88  as a whole, had 
male inequality stayed at its 1971 level but women’s relative qualifications and 
or treatment improved at their actual rates, then the pay gap would have fallen 
by  .2301 log points. Since the actual fall in the pay gap was .1735 log points, 
our figures imply that growing inequality in the 1970s and 1980s reduced the 
convergence in the pay  gap by  ,0566 log points (or about one-fourth-24.6 
percent-of  the potential decline in the pay gap). The retarding effect of  in- 
creasing inequality on female gains is also illustrated in figure 3.4, where we 
see that, had male wage inequality remained at its 1971 level, the gender ratio 
would have increased from 58.0 percent in  1971 to 73.1 percent in  1988, 4 
percentage points higher than the actual 1988 ratio of 69.0 percent. 
The results for the U.S. trends imply a moderate but noticeable effect of 
rising inequality in slowing the convergence in women’s relative pay. It is note- 
worthy that the inequality effect is smaller in table 3.9 than it is in tables 3.7 
29. Since in their study of male wage inequality Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce (1993) found that 
residual inequality grew within as well as between cohorts, they interpret the increase as being 
due to a rise in skill prices rather than to an increase in the variance of unobserved productivity 







1971 level of 
inequality 
1981 level of  0  inequality 
1988 level of 
inequality 
1971 female  1981 female 
percentile  percentile  percentile 
Fig. 3.4  Simulated female/male pay ratios: United States, 1971-88  (%) 
and 3.8.  That is, the higher U.S. level of inequality compared to other countries 
has  a larger  effect  on  intercountry  differences  in  the  gender  pay  gap than 
changes in U.S. inequality over time have had on U.S. trends in the pay gap. 
While there have been major recent changes in the U.S. wage structure, cross- 
sectional differences between the United  States and other countries are even 
more dramatic. 
3.5  Conclusions 
In this paper, we have used micro data to examine the gender pay gap in ten 
industrialized countries. Published data indicate that the gender gap is higher 
in the United States than in most industrialized countries; and it is higher than 
in six of the countries in our sample. The striking finding of  the paper is the 
importance of  wage structure in explaining the higher U.S. gender gap. The 
greater level of wage inequality in the United States than elsewhere works to 
increase the gender differential in the United  States relative to all the other 
countries in our sample. Our results suggest that the U.S. gap would be similar 
to that in countries like Sweden, Italy, and Australia (the countries with the 
smallest gaps) if  the  United  States had  their level of  wage  inequality. This 
suggests that we need to focus both on the supply of  and demand for skills 
(i.e., some of the determinants of skill prices) and on wage-setting institutions 
to explain this important cause of international differences in the gender pay 
gap. In a brief review of the institutional setting in each of these countries, we 134  Francine D. Blau and Lawrence M. Kahn 
concluded that the wage-determination process in the United States is more 
decentralized than elsewhere, quite likely contributing to its higher level of 
wage inequality. 
Much  attention  has  been  focused  on women’s  growing relative  levels  of 
slulls and labor force commitment as causes of changes in the pay  gap. Our 
research suggests that, to understand changes in the gender pay gap fully, it 
would also be fruitful to examine the effect of changes in wage structure. As a 
preliminary step in that direction, we examined male and female trends in real 
weekly  wages for the period  1971-88  in the United States to determine the 
degree to which growing US.  inequality has retarded the growth of women’s 
relative wages. In the face of rising inequality, women’s relative skills and treat- 
ment have to improve merely for the pay gap to remain constant; still larger 
gains are necessary  for it to be reduced. We found that women were able to 
counter the  effects of  rising  inequality  on their relative  earnings through  a 
steady increase in their percentile ranking in the male wage distribution, from 
19.53 in 1971 to 30.41 in 1988. The pace of this upward movement quickened 
in the 1980s, as did the increase in women’s relative wages. Our results indicate 
that increasing inequality reduced women’s potential gains in relative pay by 
about one-quarter during the period 1971-88. 
Appendix 
Variable Definitions, Means, and Earnings Regression 
Results by Country 
Definitions of the explanatory variables are given in table 3A. 1. The earnings 
definitions for each country are listed below: 
Austria. Net monthly income from employment. 
Germany and Switzerland. Net income per month after taxes and social in- 
Italy. Annual labor income. 
Britain. Total annual earnings before taxes. 
United States. Previous year’s earnings from occupation before taxes. 
Hungary. Monthly earnings. 
Sweden. Income (from all sources) in previous year. 
Norway. Annual income from all jobs. 
Australia. Annual earnings from all jobs. 
surance. 
Table 3A.1  Definitions of Explanatory Variables 
EDUC = years of  schooling completed 
PEXP = age -  EDUC -  6 
PEXPSQ = EXP2 
UNION = dummy variable for union membership Table 3A.1  (continued) 
Occupation dummy variable 
PROF = professional and technical workers (the omitted category) 
MGR = managers, except farm 
CLER = clerical workers 
SALES = sales workers 
CRAFT = craft workers 
OPER = operatives 
LAB = laborers, except farm 
SERVWK = service workers 
FARMMGR = farm managers 
FARMLAB = farm laborers 
Industry dummy variables 
AG = agriculture, forestry, and fisheries 
MICON = mining and construction 
MANDUR = durable goods manufacturing 
MANNON = nondurable goods manufacturing 
TRANS = transportation, communications. and utilities 
WTRADE = wholesale trade 
RTRADE = retail trade 
FIRE = finance, insurance, and real estate 
SERVS = services 
GOVT = government (the omitted category) 
Industry dummy variables  for Hungary 
AG(see above) 
MINMAN = mining and manufacturing 
CONST = construction 
TRANS (see above) 
TRADE = wholesale and retail trade 
SERVS = services, finance, insurance and real estate 
GOVT (see above), the omitted category 
Occupation dummy variables  for  Australia 
MGR = managers and farm managers 
CLER, CRAFT, and OPER (see above) 
LAB = laborers and farm laborers 
SALESW = sales and service workers 
PROF (see above), the omitted category 
Industry dummy variables for Australia 
AG, TRANS, MINCON (see above) 
MANUF = manufacturing 
TRADE = wholesale and retail trade 
FISERV = finance, insurance, real estate, and services 
GOVT (see above), the omitted category 
Occupation dummy variables  for Italy 
BLUE = blue collar 
WHITELOW = lower-level white collar 
WHITEHI = higher-level white collar, the omitted category 
Industry dummy variables  for Italy 
AG, TRANS, TRADE (see above) 
IND = mining, construction, and manufacturing 
FIRE, GOVT (see above) 
SERVS (see above), the omitted category Table 3A.2a  Means of Explanatory Variables 
Germany  United Kingdom  United States  Austria  Switzerland  Sweden  Norway 




















































































































































































































































































































































































.03  1 
,104 
.044 
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Table 3A.2b  Mean of Explanatory Variables 
Australia  Hungary  Italy 































,046  ,374 
.929  7.03  1 
42.370  25.865 
11.010  11.189 
19.388  17.161 
519.751  431.540 
...  ... 
,114  ,030 
,093  ,348 
,078  ,198 
,241  .038 
,116  ,033 
,157  ,149 
...  ... 
..  ... 
,034  ,013 
,104  .018 
,215  ,113 
,146  ,046 
,163  ,194 
.257  ,556 
... 
...  ... 





























































.057  ,261 
1.318  5.733 
39.163  29.515 
9.820  11.017 
23.917  19.664 
732.306  532.517 
...  ... 
...  ... 
...  ... 
...  ... 
.514  ,384 
.433  ,606 
...  ... 
.034  ,035 
..  I.. 
,116  ,162 
.112  .035 
...  ... 
,392  ,186 
,040  ,039 
.144  ,131 
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Table 3A.3  Coefficients from Regression Analysis of In  EARN 
Germany  United Kingdom 
Men  Women  Men  Women 






























6.0688  ,0912 
-.526I  ,2609 
,0256  ,0094 
,0107  ,0013 
,0478  .0042 
.0686  ,0032 
-.0011  .o001 
,0250  .0213 
.0555  ,0382 
-.1775  ,0445 
.0277  ,0523 
-.1860  ,0323 
-.2417  ,0421 
-.5462  ,0908 
-.lo20  ,0481 
-.I357  ,1695 
-.2572  ,1547 
-.2911  ,1600 
-.0050  ,0384 
,0524  ,0311 
.0353  ,0374 
,0676  ,0474 
-.0608  .0672 
-.0994  ,0536 
,1061  ,0547 




6.3533  ,1780 
-1.1741  ,1773 
,0358  ,0053 
,0027  ,0029 
,0535  .0089 
,0480  ,0058 
-.OW9  .0001 
,1033  ,0451 
,1125  ,0744 
-.0363  .0509 
-.1492  .0727 
-.2051  .0895 
-.0612  ,1521 
-.2836  .1307 
-.2497  ,0620 
-.7794  ,2792 
-.2342  ,2505 
-.0674  ,2176 
,0214  ,1311 
-.0224  ,0709 
-.I834  .0736 
.1702  ,1618 
-.0903  ,1042 
-.1338  ,0662 
.0097  ,0874 




8.0856  ,1508 
-1.3979  ,2071 
.0491  .0078 
.0045  ,0012 
,0700  .0096 
.0529  ,0033 
-.0010  ,0001 
.0515  ,0236 
,1101  ,0397 
-.3158  ,0505 
-.0606  ,0597 
-.2253  ,0373 
-.3488  .0456 
-.4431  ,0577 
-.2678  ,0535 
-.0177  ,1726 
-.3512  ,1880 
-.2860  ,1256 
,0208  .0546 
-.0594  ,0498 
,0077  ,0525 
-.0138  ,0548 
-.0411  ,0689 
-.3327  .0598 
,1424  .0643 




7.7343  ,2127 
-1.8227  ,1557 
,0579  .0029 
,0042  ,0035 
,0928  ,0112 
,0145  ,0040 
-.0002  .ow1 
.0707  ,0290 
-.0875  .0623 
p.2251  ,0430 
-.3541  .0665 
-.4172  .0680 
-.5156  ,0893 
-.2227  ,1524 
-.4489  .0467 
p.8178  ,4971 
-.6753  ,2757 
-.1540  ,2187 
,1342  ,1323 
,0971  ,0736 
,0281  ,0701 
,1142  ,0860 
,1811  ,0914 
-.1362  ,0646 
,0463  ,0738 




United States  Austria 
Men  Women  Men  Women 
Variable  Coeff.  S.E.  Coeff.  S.E.  Coeff.  S.E.  Coeff.  S.E. 
INTERCEP  8.2375  ,1770  8.1492  ,2507  8.8191  ,1507  8.5387  .2357 
PART  -.7413  .1763  -1.6344  ,1843  -1.4062  .4051  -1.3813  ,2189 
HPART  ,0238  ,0062  .0421  ,0056  ,0549  ,0162  ,0375  ,0067 
HFULL  .0085  ,0018  .0050  .0029  ,0054  ,0018  -.0029  ,0034 
EDYRS  ,0695  ,0080  .08  10  ,0117  .O 187  ,0080  ,0484  ,0124 
PEXP  ,0534  ,0055  ,0333  ,0066  .0342  ,0053  ,0301  ,0066 
PEXPSQ  -  ,0008  ,000 1  -  ,0004  .0001  -  ,0005  ,0001  -  ,0005  .OOO 1 
UNION  ,2222  .0469  . I344  .0704  ,0789  ,0354  ,0761  ,0492 
MGR  .0757  ,0642  ,0927  .0838  -.0908  ,0755  -.lo68  ,1151 
CLER  -.3257  ,0908  -.1161  ,0748  -.2499  .0747  -.0954  ,0754 139  The Gender Earnings Gap: Some International Evidence 
Table 3A.3  (continued) 
United States  Austria 
Men  Women  Men  Women 










































-.0660  .0917  -.5432  ,1189 
-.1738  ,0681  -.I290  ,1575 
-.3292  ,0780  -.2162  ,1259 
-.5927  ,0952  -.5162  ,2501 
-.3620  ,0838  -.4565  ,0804 
-.4261  .2119  .4187  ,4612 
-.5874  ,2447  -.9051  ,5658 
.I102  ,1743  -.5273  ,2605 
-.I844  ,0884  b.3026  ,2211 
,0177  ,0828  .0655  ,1378 
-.0550  ,0898  -.2454  ,1371 
,0403  .0914  ,1340  ,1507 
-.2941  ,1103  -.2987  ,1933 
-.3025  ,0864  -.3796  ,1089 
,0399  ,1056  -.0377  .I214 
-.2801  ,0759  -.2486  ,0973 
.6717  ,7725 
.3808  ,4206 
1,406  1,194 
Switzerland 
Men  Women 
Coeff.  S.E.  Coeff.  S.E. 
6.2999  ,1917  6.2689  3978 
,0939  ,5455  -2.1373  .6649 
-.oO08  ,0203  ,0665  .0164 
.0082  ,0028  ,0021  ,0117 
,0548  ,0067  ,0736  .0172 
,0719  .0076  ,0543  ,0155 
-.0010  .0001  -.oO08  .0003 
,0292  ,0440  ,1327  .I135 
,1735  .0673  -.0985  ,1800 
-.0448  ,0831  -.0022  ,1503 
-.1387  .I082  -.3101  ,2676 
-.2318  ,0739  -.I221  ,4239 
-.I631  ,0921  -.lo92  ,3465 
-.2081  .I578  -.I627  ,3438 
-.2955  ,1146  -.3821  ,2029 
-1.0129  ,2748  -.2577  ,7095 
.0150  ,4585  ,1439  ,5670 
-.0096  ,2132  -.2208  ,5417 
,0720  ,0823  ,2963  ,4067 
,1055  .0706  ,1037  ,1809 
-.2707  .I085  -.I729  ,1159 
-.2919  ,0668  -.3829  ,1136 
-.3266  ,0800  -.2741  ,1462 
-.3842  .0959  -.3099  ,1505 
-.2849  ,0839  -.3055  ,0791 
-.7096  ,1633  -.6664  .2803 
-.4406  ,1587  -.4234  ,2150 
-.0389  ,1388  -.0132  ,2601 
,0493  ,0649  -.I102  ,1338 
-.0275  .0588  ,0764  ,0972 
,0299  ,0667  -.0295  .0975 
-.0171  ,0734  ,0940  .1939 
,2073  ,1069  ,1628  ,1249 
-.I369  ,0894  .0098  ,1026 
.2223  ,0937  ,1295  ,1151 
-.0078  ,0683  ,0330  ,0705 
,3967  ,4450 
,2883  ,3754 
642  436 
Sweden 
Men  Women 
Coeff.  S.E.  Coeff.  S.E. 
9.4122  .2359  9.6928  SO82 
-.7021  ,3539  -1.1591  .4648 
,0198  ,0129  .0307  .0061 
,0047  ,0028  .0011  .0106 
.0434  .0098  ,0426  ,0116 
,0674  ,0063  .0297  ,0082 
-.0010  .oO01  -.o004  ,0002 
.I856  .0575  .2828  ,0701 
,1813  ,1060  .2228  ,2065 
-.0589  ,0980  .0820  ,0959 
,0591  ,1356  -.0116  .1649 
-.0151  ,0786  -.I128  ,2179 
-.I832  .0750  ,1938  ,1467 
-.I149  .I272  ,0597  ,3691 
-.2598  ,0980  -.0610  ,0887 
-.5679  ,2391  .OoO0  .oooO 
-.I725  .2900  -.5875  ,3538 
,2624  ,1842  .oooO  .oooO 
,1777  ,1182  ,3277  ,2192 
.I746  ,1123  -.0218  ,1572 140  Francine D. Blau and Lawrence M. Kahn 
~ 
Table 3A.3  (continued) 
United States  Austria 
Men  Women  Men  Women 










.0478  ,0736 
-.0187  ,0986 
-.2745  .4206 
.OoOo  .OOOo 
.2721  ,0874 




-.0111  ,1906 
.4299  ,2779 
,3203  ,3443 
.oooo  .oOoO 
,2463  ,2221 




,1167  ,1225 
.I508  ,1147 
.1869  ,1530 
.0322  .I748 
,5201  ,1931 
.I146  ,1065 
,423  1 
,4240 
457 
-.1237  ,1481 
,0280  ,1517 
,0207  ,2764 
-.0353  ,1762 
.2367  ,2120 




Norway  Australia 
Men  Women  Men  Women 






























10.2470  ,1844 
-1.5105  ,1818 
,0536  ,0066 
,0052  ,0016 
,0453  0070 
.0531  ,0048 
-.o008  .OOO1 
,0648  .0331 
,0465  .0592 
-.0051  .0620 
,0073  ,0784 
-.0630  ,0552 
-.1419  ,0607 
-.1307  ,1281 
.0094  ,0752 
-.5140  ,1725 
-.7038  ,2001 
.3971  ,1934 
-.0478  .1311 
-.0037  ,1273 
-.2243  ,1476 
-.0315  ,1303 
.1342  .1421 
-.0375  .1434 
.1425  .I383 




1  1.1202  .3962  INTERCEP 
-2.0945  ,3370  PART 
,0529  ,0046  WART 
-.0095  .GO78  HFULL 
,0385  ,0119  EDYRS 
,0099  ,0072  PEXP 
-.OOOl  .OOO1  PEXPSQ 
.2091  .0499  MGR 
-0028  ,1238  CLER 
-.0582  .0723  SALESW 
,0232  ,1311  CRAFT 
-.I612  ,1977  OPER 
-.2354  ,1329  LAB 
.0766  ,2741  AG 
-.2786  ,0764  MICON 
2.1019  ,5204  MANUF 
1.0246  ,5229  TRANS 
-1.5774  ,4789  TRADE 
-.3251  ,2456  FISERV 
-.I261  ,1755 
-.2625  .1919 
,2525  .2193 
-.2353  .I989 
-.3269  .I830 
-0611  ,1834 













-  ,2205 
-.I485 
-  ,2629 
-.8151 
-  ,0603 
-  .083  1 
-  ,0072 
-.2151 
-  ,2083 































-  ,3662 







,5998  .68 11 
.3135  .43  18 
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Table 3A.3  (continued) 
Hungary  Italy 
Men  Women  Men  Women 
Variable  Coeff.  S.E.  Coeff.  S.E.  Variable  Coeff.  S.E.  Coeff.  S.E. 
INTERCEP  8.1770  .0830  7.7577  ,0807  INTERCEP  8.7303  ,0783  8.7173  ,1579 
EDYRS  ,0375  ,0036  ,0463  ,0039  PART  -.4825  .lo64  -3566  .1268 
PEXP  ,0329  ,0030  ,0319  ,0028  HPART  ,0205  ,0039  .0207  .0030 
PEXPSQ  -.0006  .0001  -.0005  .0001  HFULL  .0082  ,0012  ,0005  ,0027 
UNION  ,0115  ,0212  ,1027  ,0225  ED  ,0395  ,0022  .0525  .0034 
MGR  .0552  .0475  -.1281  ,0466  EXP  ,0457  .0019  .0377  ,0027 
CLER  -.1546  ,0451  -.I851  ,0293  EXPSQ  -.0007  .0000  -.0005  ,0001 
SALES  -.3007  ,0961  -.3734  .0578  BLUE  -.5476  .0330  -.4142  .0950 
CRAFT  -.0550  ,0358  -.2164  ,0419  WHITELOW  -.3783  ,0294  -.2420  ,0910 
OPER  -.0717  ,0374  -.I305  ,0420  AG  -.1392  ,0363  -.6666  .0523 
LAB  -.I076  .0453  -.2507  .0357  IND  .0579  ,0196  ,0102  ,0282 
SERVWK  -.0977  ,0558  -.I862  ,0378  TRADE  ,0578  ,0245  .0299  .0287 
FARMMGR  -.0564  ,0904  -.8869  ,1567  TRANS  ,1081  .0243  ,0420  ,0504 
FARMLAB  -.I442  .0545  -.3435  .0630  FIRE  ,2218  ,0338  ,1546  ,0481 
AG  -.0517  .0455  ,0054  .0495  GOVT  -.0162  ,0228  -.@I15  ,0299 
MINMAN  .0536  .0428  -.0593  ,0439 
CONST  -.0230  ,0496  -.0012  ,0560 
TRANS  -.0735  ,0490  ,0197  ,0538 
TRADE  -.I243  ,0630  -.0216  ,0506 
SERVS  ,0264  .0447  -.1825  ,0427 
SEE  ,3905  ,3668  ,381  1  ,4375 
R2  .2059  .2819  ,3995  ,3741 
Sample size  1,876  1,835  4,152  2,480 
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